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The  price  sensitivity  of business  investment  spending  is a central  element  in 
economic  analysis.  A substantial  response  of  capital  spending  to  its user  cost,  which 
combines  interest,  tax,  and  depreciation  rates  with  relative  prices,  is critical  to  evaluating 
the  effectiveness  of monetary  policy,  deficit  reduction,  and  tax  reform.  In  spite  of this 
central  role,  however,  the  supporting  evidence  for  a substantial  user  cost  elasticity  (UCE) 
is modest.  Several  important  concerns  suggest  a downward  bias  in elasticities  estimated 
from  the  aggregate  data  typically  employed  in UCE  research.  These  biases  may  arise  from 
firm  heterogeneity,  measurement  error,  capital  market  frictions,  and  simultaneity.  While 
such  biases  are theoretically  plausible,  their  empirical  importance  remains  to  be 
substantiated. 
With  a particularly  rich  data  set,  containing  over  26,000  observations,  this  paper 
explores  what  can be learned  about  the  UCE  from  micro  data.  Investment  and  firm-level 
control  variables  are taken  from  an extensive  panel  of  Compustat  firms.  To  construct  the 
user  cost,  we  tap  a new  data  source  that  provides  variation  across  firms  as well  as across 
time.  A number  of the  econometric  biases  mentioned  above  have  a substantial  impact  on 
the  estimated  UCE.  After  correcting  for  the  biases,  we  obtain  a precisely  estimated  but 
small  value  for  the  UCE  of about  -0.25.  The  effects  of capital  gains  tax  cuts  and  the  “flat- 
tax”  proposal  on  investment  are  evaluated  with  this  estimated  UCE. The  price  sensitivity  of business  investment  spending  is a central  element  in economic 
analysis.  A substantial  response  of  capital  spending  to  its user  cost,  which  combines  interest, 
tax,  and  depreciation  rates  with  relative  prices,  is critical  in controversies  surrounding  the 
transmission  of monetary  policy,  the  conduct  of aggregate  stabilization  policy,  and  the  impact 
of fiscal  policy.  With  a particularly  rich  data  set,  this  paper  takes  a fresh  look  at the  user  cost 
elasticity,  exploring  what  can  be learned  about  this  key  parameter  from  microeconomic  data. 
The  user  cost  elasticity  (UCE)  plays  a significant  role  in the  long-standing  controversy 
about  how  monetary  policy  impacts  real variables.  The  standard  description  of the  monetary 
transmission  mechanism  holds  that  monetary  policy  affects  real  activity  by altering  the  level  of 
reserves  in the  banking  system  that,  in turn,  affects  short-term  interest  rates  and,  through  the 
term  structure,  long-term  interest  rates.  With  a substantial  UCE,  monetary  policy  can  have  an 
important  effect  on  business  investment  spending.  The  absence  of a significant  UCE  casts 
doubt  on  the  validity  of this  version  of the  monetary  transmission  mechanism. r 
Implicit  assumptions  about  the  UCE  also  loom  large  in real  business  cycle  models.  For 
example,  Christian0  and  Eichenbaum  (1992,  p. 433)  use  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function, 
and  hence  they  maintain  that  the  UCE  is unity.  Thus,  the  ability  of RBC  models  to -reproduce 
certain  features  of  macroeconomic  data  is based  in part  on  capital  formation  (defined  in terms 
of foregone  consumption)  being  quite  responsive  to  variations  in interest  rates.  This 
responsiveness  remains  unconfirmed  econometrically. 
The  price  sensitivity  of investment  is also  a key  element  in analyzing  fiscal  policies. 
The  simulation  models  of  Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  (1987)  and  Razin  and  Yuen  (1996),  for 
’ This  empirical  shortcoming  of  the  money  view,  along  with  new  insights  from  the  economics  of  information,  has  led 
many  to  favor  a credit  view  of  the  transmission  mechanism,  which  holds  that  variations  in the  availability  of  credit  is the 
1 example, is based on a Cobb-Douglas  technology.  This technology  and its UCE of unity may 
play a large role in assessing the quantitative  effects of fiscal policy changes.  Indeed,  the UCE 
is likely to be important  in estimating the effects of a wide variety of fiscal measures  designed 
to spur capital formation,  such as cuts in the capital gains tax rate and the institution  of a “flat 
tax.”  We consider the implications  of our results for the effectiveness  of both  of these policies. 
Despite  the key role played by the UCE across a wide spectrum of economic  analyses, 
the supporting  evidence for a substantial UCE is modest.  A recent survey of a variety  of 
econometric  investment  models found little compelling evidence that,  as historically 
implemented,  tax and interest rate policies are effective in stimulating business fixed investment 
(Chirinko,  1993).  Blanchard  (1986, p. 153) writes “[i]t is well known that to get the user cost 
to appear at all in the investment  equation,  one has to display more than the usual amount  of 
econometric  ingenuity.”  Bemanke  and Gertler (1995, p. 27) add that “empirical  studies of 
supposedly  ‘interest-sensitive’  components  of aggregate  spending have in fact had great 
diiculty  in identifying  a quantitatively  important  effect of the neoclassical  cost-of-capital 
variable.”  What  should one make of the apparent inconsistency  between  widely held beliefs 
about a large UCE and the paucity  of empirical support for such beliefs?  Is the true UCE 
much lower than most economists  assume (possibly due to low substitution  possibilities  in 
production)  or is there  some fundamental  misspecification in econometric  models that prevents 
empirical research  from uncovering  the true UCE?  It is important  to note that  most empirical 
studies of the UCE are based on aggregate  data. 2 Several important  concerns,  however,  have 
channel  through  which  monetary  policy  affects  the  real  economy.  The  key  implication  of  this  view  is  that  monetary 
policy  remains  effective  even  with  a  low  UCE.  See  Bemanke  and  Gertler  (1995)  for  further  discussion. 
2 See  Chirinko  (1993).  Studies  that  have  used  firm-level  data  include  Eisner  (1967,  1978).  Jorgenson  and  Siebert  (1968). 
Cummins  and  Hassett  (1992),  and  Cummins,  Hassett,  and  Hubbard  (1994,  1996).  The  latter  three  studies  conclude  that 
some  historical  tax  policy  changes  have  had  a substantial  impact  on  investment. 
2 been  raised  about  elasticities  estimated  from  aggregate  data  that  suggest  such  estimates  may  be 
biased  downward  due  to  problems  with  firm  heterogeneity,  simultaneity,  measurement  error, 
and  capital  market  frictions.  While  these  biases  are theoretically  plausible,  their  empirical 
importance  remains  to  be explored  and  substantiated. 
Such  an exploration  is undertaken  in this  paper,  which  uses  an extensive  body  of 
microeconomic  data  to  estimate  the  sensitivity  of business  capital  formation  to  the  user  cost  of 
capital.  Micro  data  clearly  are  essential  to  control  for  firm  heterogeneity.  The  substantial 
variation  in the  data  at our  disposal  also  may  improve  the  quality  of instruments  needed  to 
control  for  simultaneity.  The  sample  is constructed  from  Compustat  “full  coverage”  files  and 
contains  4,112  manufacturing  and  non-manufacturing  firms.  After  computing  the  necessary 
variables  and  lags,  the  regression  data  include  over  26,000  observations  tiom  198 1 to  1991. 
These  firms  account  for  roughly  half  of aggregate  U.S.  capital  spending  in the  middle  of the 
sample  period.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the  coverage  of  our  sample  is greater  than 
available  in any previous  study  of U.S.  investment  with  firm-level  data.  This  extensive 
coverage  allows  us  to  use  econometric  panel  methods  to  isolate  biases,  and  it increases 
confidence  when  extrapolating  the  empirical  results  to  the  economy  at large.  . 
In  addition  to  the  Compustat  data,  we  tap  a new  source  to  construct  the  user  cost  of 
capital.  Previous  studies,  including  some  that  employ  micro-data,  typically  test  the  sensitivity 
of investment  to  user  cost  components,  such  as interest  rates  and  tax  parameters,  that  only 
vary  over  time  and  are  assumed  constant  across  firms.  We  have  merged  user  cost  variables 
defined  at the  industry  level  with  Compustat  firm  data.  Thus,  the  user  cost  data  vary  in both 
time-series  and  cross-sectional  dimensions.  This  variation  attenuates  concerns  about  bias  due 
3 to  measurement  error.  Furthermore,  cross-sectional  variation  permits  us  to  account  for  fkm 
heterogeneity  that  may  have  affected  prior  UCE  estimates  from  aggregate  data. 
Initial  results  suggest  that  the  UCE  estimated  from  micro  data  may  be much  larger  (ii 
absolute  value)  and  more  precisely  estimated  than  is usually  the  case  with  aggregate  data. 
Consider  the  following  OLS  equation  regressing  the  investment/capital  ratio  for  firm  i at time  t 
pit/  Kit-l)  on  distributed  lags  of the  percentage  changes  in the  user  cost  (Q,  contemporaneous 
and  six lags)  and  sales  (Sit,  contemporaneous  and  4 lags)  and  an intercept  (4).  (A  detailed 
discussion  of this  equation  will be  presented  in Section  3): 
(1)  1i.t  1 Kit-1  =  a(L)(AUi,l/  Ui,t-1)  + P4(L)(M,t/  Sit-1) + 0 + Ei,t 
SUM(a)  =  -0.660  SUM@)  =  0.488  R2 = 0.120 
(0.04  1)  (0.009) 
The  sum  of the  estimated  a’s  is the  UCE,  and  it is a substantial  -0.660  with  a standard  error  of 
only  0.041.  This  estimate  is much  larger  than  the  near-zero  values  frequently  reported  in 
studies  that  employ  aggregate  data. 
While  this  initial  result  is promising,  several  biases  may  affect  the  estimated  UCE,  and 
their  impact  can be  assessed  with  our  data.  We  find  that  firm  heterogeneity,  measurement 
error,  and  simultaneity  biases  all affect  the  estimated  UCE.  In  addition,  the  omission  of 
variables  that  measure  firms’  access  to  internal  fimds  causes  an omitted  variable  bias.  While 
controlling  for  these  biases  raises  the  absolute  value  of the  UCE  in some  cases,  the  net  effect  is 
to  substantially  reduce  the  UCE  relative  to  the  OLS  estimate  presented  above.  We  conclude 
that  the  UCE  is in the  neighborhood  of -0.25  with  a standard  error  of 0.03  to  0.06  (depending 
on the  particular  estimator  employed).  This  point  estimate  is much  lower  than  the  UCE  often 
4 assumed in academic  and policy research.  But the precision  of the estimate  is striking, 
allowing us to clearly reject the hypotheses that the UCE is zero or unity. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  The data set combining  Compustat  and user cost 
information  is central  to this study, and it is described in section  1.  Substantial  firm 
heterogeneity  is documented.  Section 2 derives the equation  used in our econometric 
exploration  and discusses the interpretation  of the coefficient  estimates.  Throughout  the 
paper, we focus  on the UCE as the measure of the price sensitivity  of capital.  Section  3 begins 
with a UCE estimated  from aggregate data and shows potential  benefits  of micro data.  We 
then explore various  biases and identify our preferred instrumental  variables  estimates, 
including results from the new “orthogonal  deviations”  estimator  presented  in Arellano  and 
Bover  (1995).  The estimates fall in a narrow range from -0.18 to -0.25.  They are precisely 
estimated,  statistically  far from both zero and unity, and hence much diierent  from values 
often  assumed in calibration  and policy studies.  Section 4 presents  some simple policy 
evaluations  and section  5 concludes. 
1.  Data  and  Firm-Specific  Variation 
To estimate  the UCE, we link two unique data sources  that  each provide  information 
particularly  well-suited  to our objectives.  The investment,  sales and cash flow data come fkom 
the extensive  Compustat  “Ml  coverage” files.  The user cost variable  is constructed  from 
industry-level  information  maintained by Data Resources,  Inc.  The marriage  of these data 
sources allows us to conduct  empirical analyses that are not possible with the aggregate  time- 
series information  used in most previous research on investment  and the user cost. 
5 We employ the version of Compustat that covers the 20-year  period  1972-1991.  After 
selecting  usable data for regressions and computing the necessary  lags, we have a sample of 
4,095  firms from all sectors of the economy that provide 26,071 annual observations  for the 
regressions  from the period  1981 to  1991  .3 In the middle of the sample (1987) our data 
account  for 48 percent  of aggregate U.S. non-residential  fixed investment.  The sample 
contains  43 percent  of sales of final and intermediate goods for the same year. 
Compustat  firm data provide us with substantial benefits vi.&-vis the aggregate  time- 
series used in most of the empirical literature on the UCE.  One clear benefit arises from 
statistical  efficiency.  Obviously, we have a huge number of degrees of freedom.  Even though 
many of the questions  of interest deal with the effect of economy-wide  changes (such as 
movements  in tax or interest rates that affect all firms), micro data give us a large number of 
replicated  “experiments”  that greatly improve the precision  of our results.  Improved  precision 
may be important  for identifying the UCE, especially to the extent that  aggregate  results are 
imprecisely  estimated  and are therefore  not able to reject the hypotheses  of a UCE equal to 
zero or unity.  Furthermore,  micro data allow us to estimate a given parameter  over a relatively 
short time fkune,  thus lessening the role played by parameter  instability  across time.  Finally, 
firm data help us to address and quantify a variety of econometric  biases in ways that would be 
difficult,  if not impossible, with aggregate time series data. 
The user cost data complement the extensive firm heterogeneity  available from 
Compustat  by providing  additional  micro-level variation.  We obtained  information  on the user 
costs for 26 different capital assets (24 types of equipment and two types of structures).  These 
3 To  protect  against  results  driven  by  a small  number  of  extreme  observations,  we  exclude  observations  in  the  one  percent 
tail  from  the  distribution  for  each  independent  variable  in the  regression.  We  estimate  some  regressions  with  fewer  than 
6 underlying  user costs, based on Hall and Jorgenson  (1967) and modified by DRI,  can be 
represented  as: 
(2)  vi&* =  [PV  P’iJl  [(I ‘-  rnjt  - Zj.t)  1  (l-r,)]  [rt + Sj] 
where p’u is the asset-specific  purchase price for asset j at time t, pya is the industry  i output 
price at time t, r( is the financial  cost of capital (the same for all industries  and assets),4 and Sj is 
the asset-specific  economic  depreciation  rate.  The investment  tax credit (mu) and discounted 
value of tax depreciation  allowances  (G) also vary across assets. We created  industry-specific 
user costs as a weighted  average  of the asset user costs.  The weights  are the proportion  of 
capital accounted  for by each asset for 26 different industries.5  This industry  information  was 
then merged with the firm-level Compustat  data using each firm’s S.I.C. code.6 
Table  1 provides  summary statistics for the main variables that enter our regression. 
The variable &/ &,  is the investment-capital  ratio (firm and industry  subscripts  are suppressed 
for simplicity).  Investment  is Compustat’s  capital expenditure  variable from firms’ uses of 
funds statement.  Capital is the estimated constant  dollar replacement  value of plant and 
equipment.7  The t-l  subscript on the capital stock indicates that it is measured  at the 
26,071  observation  b-use  differencing  the  data  lowers  the  observation  count. 
4 The  financial  cost  of  capital  is  defined  as  a weighted  average  of  the  cost  of  quity  (the  dividend-price  ratio  for  Standard 
&  Poor’s  Composite  Stock price Index  plus  an  expected  long-run  growth  rate  of  2.4  percent,  with  a weight  of  0.67)  and 
the  cost  of debt  (average  yield  on  new  issues  of  high-grade  corporate  bonds  adjusted  to  a AAA  basis,  with  a weight  of 
0.33).  The  cost  of  debt  is  lowered  by  its  tax  deductibility  and  the  expected  inflation  rate,  defined  as  a weighted  average  of 
past  GDP  deflator  growth  rates. 
’  These  weights  are  from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  capital  flow  tables  and  reflect  asset  usage  by  establishment. 
The  Compustat  data  reflect  ownership  by  company. 
6 Because  the  DRI  user  cost  data  are  quarterly,  we  average  them  to  obtain  an  annual  user  cost.  The  averages  are 
computed  at the  fum  level  to  account  for  the  fact  that  firms  have  different  fiscal  years.  The  user  cost  information  is 
therefore  tailored  to  each  firm’s  specific  accounting  period,  which  introduces  further  cross-sectional  heterogeneity  in the 
data. 
’  The  capital  stock  replacement  value  estimates  are  based  upon  the  iterative  perpetual  inventory  method  presented  in 
Salinger  and  Summers  (1983)  modified  to  account  for  acquisitions  and  divestitures  as  described  in  appendix  B. 
7 beginning  of each accounting  year.  Output is measured by sales.* Nominal  sales data are 
taken  from the Compustat  net sales figure, and they are deflated by the industry-specific  output 
price  deflator  used to define the user cost in equation 2 (p’~).  The growth  rate of real sales is 
represented  by AS, / ZL.  Cash flow (CF3, which is scaled  by the beginning-of-period  capital 
stock, is net after-tax  income plus non-cash  expenses.  The latter consists  primarily  of 
depreciation.  The AU, / IL  variable is the percentage change in the user cost  defined in 
equation  (2).  Further  details about data definitions appear in appendix B. 
Summary statistics for our data appear in table 1.  The Compustat  variables  in the first 
three rows have skewed distributions  as one would expect in firm data.  The gross investment- 
to-capital  ratios  (mean of 0.173 and median of 0.125) are consistent  with moderate  capital 
stock growth,  assuming that typical depreciation  rates are in the range of  10 to  12 percent. 
Mean real sales grew by 3 .O  percent  per year in our  198  1 to  199 1 sample, although  median 
sales growth  was more modest  at 1.8 percent.  The summary statistics  for AU, / U,, reveal that 
the user cost fell on average from  1981 to  1991 (mean of -1.3 percent,  median  of -2.3 
percent).  The within-firm  standard  deviations reported  in table  1 show substantial  variability  of 
the firm data across time.g  The within-firm  standard deviations  exceed the means for all three 
Compustat  variables. 
Of particular  note,  given the emphasis here on microeconomic  variation,  is the 
information  on the percentage  of firm-specific time variation  in the data.  This percentage  is 1 
minus the R-squared  statistic  from the regression: 
* The  primary  variation  in  output  is  due  to  sales.  Blinder  and  Mac&i  (1991,  Table  3)  report  that  the  ratio  of  the  variance 
of  output  to  the  variance  of  sales  is  1.03. 
’  These  standard  deviations  measure  variability  in the  data  across  time,  not  across  firms.  To  accomplish  this,  we  subtract 
the  firm-by-firm  means  from  each  variable  prior  to computing  the  standard  deviation. 
8 (3)  (&t-ai)=bt+qt 
where  Xit  - ai represents  mean-differenced  variables  for  firm  i at time  t, b  is the  coefficient  on  a 
time  dummy  that  is one  for  period  t Ad  zero  otherwise,  and  Ed is an error  term.  Because  the 
data  are  mean  difkenced,  they  represent  time  series  variation  alone.  The  statistic  reported  in 
table  1, therefore,  indicates  the  proportion  of time  variation  in the  data  that  cannot  be 
explained  by  aggregate  time  effects,  i.e.,  the  variance  of  eit relative  to  the  variance  of 
( xi,  - ai).  If this statistic  equals  zero,  firm-specific  variation  is completely  absent.  For  the 
Compustat  variables  (L / K-i,  AS, / S,,,  and  CF, / Kt.,), over  97  percent  of variation  is firm 
specific.  This  statistic  is lower  for  the  user  cost  because  variation  in the  interest  rate  and  the 
tax  parameters  is determined  to  a greater  degree  by aggregate  factors.  Nonetheless,  over  67 
percent  of the  variation  in the  composite  user  cost  is not  explained  by aggregate  time  dummies, 
indicating  that  the  data  we  construct  from  the  DRI  source  also  has  substantial  micro-level 
variation. 
2.  Econometric  Investment  Equations:  Specification  Issues 
In  choosing  an econometric  specification  to  estimate  the  UCE,  the  major  problem 
facing  the  applied  econometrician  is to  relate  unobservable  expectations  of future  conditions  to 
observable  variables.  The  primary  choice  is whether  to  employ  a structural  model,  with 
estimating  equations  derived  explicitly  from  an optimization  problem,  or  a distributed  lag 
model  that  relies  less  on theory.  The  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  each  approach  are  evaluated 
9 in the first subsection below.  A brief derivation  of the investment  equation  used in this study is 
presented  in the second subsection. lo 
DisaibutedLag  versus  StmcturalA4odels 
Econometric  investment  models can be divided into one of two classes:  distributed  lag 
and structural  models.  Based on formal static theory  and plausible intuitions,  the distributed 
lag approach  specifies several factors that could affect investment  spending.  Among other 
variables that have been included are sales, output,  capacity utilization,  profits,  the flow or 
stock of “liquidity,”  balance sheet ratios, debt service, depreciation  charges, the gross or net 
capital stock, the age of the capital stock, equity yields, interest  and inflation  rates, prices of 
output,  labor, and capital, and taxes either as statutory  rates or payments.  Contemporaneous 
and lagged values of these variables usually enter the regression  and, combined with the 
estimated  coefficients,  proxy for unobservable  future expectations. 
While early studies with distributed lag models employed various  combinations  of these 
variables, the focus has been narrowed  considerably  by the work  of Dale Jorgenson  (1963, 
1971) and his numerous  collaborators.  In the “Jorgensonian  Neoclassical”  model, investment 
depends on the percentage  changes in sales and the user cost of capital.  Additionally,  a 
measure of liquidity has frequently  been included, reflecting that finance may not be readily 
available or internal funds may increase the speed with which firms acquire the desired amount 
of capital.  Thus, the primary determinants  of investment  spending are sales (or output),  the 
user cost of capital, and liquidity. 
lo See Chirinko (1993) for a more detailed survey of econometric investment models and empirical results and an extensive list of 
references to several of the issues discussed  in this section. 
10 Distributed  lag  models  perform  well  empirically.  They  explain  much  of the  variation  in 
aggregate  data  and,  apart  Corn  the  user  cost,  usually  generate  precisely  estimated, 
economically  significant  coefficients’that  have  the  theoretically  predicted  sign.  Furthermore, 
despite  the  availability  of  alternative  specifications,  distributed  lag  models  continue  to  be the 
model  of choice  among  f0recasters.u 
Questions  arise,  however,  about  interpreting  the  estimated  coefficients.  As  noted 
above,  distributed  lag  coefficients  are used  to  forecast  future  variables.  The  coefficients  also 
represent  the  parameters  of the  underlying  technology,  such  as the  production  function, 
delivery  lags,  and  expenditure  lags.  Estimated  coefficients  are  thus  an amalgam  of the 
underlying  technology  and  expectations  parameters  and,  without  &-ther  information,  it is 
diflicult  to  identify  separately  these  underlying  parameters. 
This  lack  of identification  makes  inferences  potentially  problematic.  As  argued  by 
Lucas  (1976),  the  underlying  expectation  parameters  may  not  remain  stable  in the  face  of 
policy  interventions.  Instability  in expectation  parameters  will  lead  to  instability  in the 
estimated  coefficients  over  the  sample  period  and  during  counter-factual  policy  analyses. 
This  concern  has  led to  an alternative  approach  for  specifying  investment  models  that 
imposes  more  structure  on  the  econometric  model.  12 In  these  structural  models,  dynamic 
elements  are  incorporated  explicitly  into  an optimization  problem  of  a firm  looking  far into  the 
future,  and  the  conditions  characterizing  optimizing  behavior  are used  to  derive  an econometric 
equation.  These  investment  equations  contain  a shadow  price  for  capital  that  extends  into  the 
future  and  is usually  unobservable  to  the  econometrician.  Moreover,  the  estimated  coefficients 
l1  For  example,  see  the  forecasting  models  described  in Pmkken,  Varvares,  and  Meyer  (1991)  and  Sinai  (1992). 
11 are  linked  explicitly  to  the  underlying  technology  and  expectation  parameters  that  can  be 
identified  separately.  Thus,  this  class  of models  is immune  to  the  Lucas  Critique. 
This  immunization,  however,.proves  somewhat  costly.  There  are  three  general 
solutions  to  the  problem  created  by the  unobservable  shadow  price  of capital.  First,  the 
shadow  price  can  be  equated  to  financial  market  data  (i.e.,  the  Brainard-Tobin  Q).  Second,  the 
investment  equation  can  be transformed  so that  most  of the  &ure  unobservable  variables  are 
eliminated;  the  resulting  Euler  equation  is relativefy  straightforward  to  estimate.  Third,  the 
terms  constituting  the  shadow  price  from  period  t onward  can be  forecasted  using  data 
available  in period  t (e.g.,  Abel  and Blanchard,  1986).  Unfortunately,  the  resulting  investment 
models  do  not  usually  perform  well  empirically.  13 Structural  models  provide  attractive 
frameworks  for  ultimately  understanding  investment  behavior,  but  their  overall  empirical 
performance  raises  questions  about  the  ability  of the  current  generation  of models  to  deliver 
empirical  estimates  useful  in the  analysis  of public  policies.  l4 
The  applied  econometrician  is thus  faced  with  the  dilemma  of  choosing  between 
distributed  lag  models  that  are empirically  dependable  but  conceptually  fragile,  or  structural 
models  that  have  a solid  theoretical  foundation  but  an unsteady  empirical  superstructure.  Both 
approaches  have  strengths  and weaknesses,  and  thus  both  provide  useM  and  complementary 
information.  The  Lucas  Critique  with  its emphasis  on  structural  models  has  resulted  in 
dramatic  changes  in the  formulation  of models  and  direction  of research,  but  its empirical 
l2  It is not,  however,  the only  nzsponse.  Believing  that the assumptions  needed  to achieve  identification  are  “incredible,”  Gordon 
and  Veitch  (1986) and  a few  other  authors  impose  less  structure  than  in distributed  lag models,  and  estimate  hybrid  VARs. 
l3  See  Chirinko  (1993,  Section  3) for  further  discussion  and  Oliner,  Rudebusch,  and  Sichel(l995)  for a comparison  of the 
forecasting  performance  of  structural  and  distributed  lag models. 
l4  This  is not to say  that progress  is not being  made;  for example,  see  the  innovative  analyses  of Goulder  and  Summers  (1989) 
and  Jorgenson  and Yun  (1991). 
12 relevance  has been questioned.is  (In section 4 we present  a new test of the empirical 
importance  of the Lucas Critique that exploits panel data.)  Furthermore,  distributed  lag 
models provide  a direct estimate  of the user cost elasticity of primary concern  to this study. 
Thus, we proceed  with estimating  a distributed  lag model, though  our policy  assessments must 
be tempered  by the above caveats. 
A Distributed  Lug Investment  Model 
The distributed  lag investment  model developed  in this subsection  is based on a firm’s 
demand for capital and, with the addition  of dynamics, demand for investment.  The demand 
for capital follows  directly from the first-order  conditions  for profit-maximizing  behavior  when 
expectations  are static.  Maintaining  that the production  function  has a constant  elasticity  of 
substitution  (0) between  capital and variable inputs, we obtain the following  well-known 
relation  between  the desired (or optimal)  stock of capital (K*S, the level of sales (or output), 
and the user cost (or rental price) of capital (II*), 
(4)  K*( =  c St U,” , 
where Ut is defined in (2) and c is the CES distribution  parameter. 
Absent any dynamic considerations,  the firm would achieve K*t instantaneously. 
Dynamics  enter when  specifying the demand for investment,  which is divided between 
replacement  and net components.  In the present model, the translation  from a stock  demand to 
a flow demand depends  on depreciation  and delivery lags.  Capital is assumed to depreciate 
ls  For  example,  the  impact  of  the  Lucas  Critique  on  investment  models  is  examined  in  Chirinko  (1988)  who  assumes  that 
the  volatile  fiscal  env’ironment  of  the  1980s  reflected  unanticipated  changes  in  the  policy  regime.  The  instability 
13 geometrically  at a constant  mechanistic  rate (6); hence, replacement  investment  (r,)  is 
proportional  to the capital stock  available at the beginning of the period, 
Net investment  (I”J is the change in the capital stock between periods t-l  and t, and is scaled 
by the existing stock.  This ratio  (plus 1  .O) equals K / K-1, and it adjusts according  to the 
weighted  geometric  mean of relative  changes in the desired capital stock, 




=  I-If  dK;_,  K:_,,  +  1-olp’ 
h-0 
where the p’s represent  the delivery lag distribution  extending for H+ 1 periods. l6  Taking  logs 
of (6), using the approximation  In( 1+x) = x, differencing the logarithm  of (4) and substituting  it 
into (6) for (AK*  / K*), using (5) for replacement  investment,  and appending  a stochastic  error 
(ES,  we obtain the distributed  lag investment  equation: 
(7) 
It iKt-l =  I;  / Kt_, + I;  / Kt_, 
=6+a&~(AU1_h  &,-,)+&h(AS~-~  ‘S&,)+Et’ 
h=O  II=0 
There  are two  extensions  of (7) that are important  for understanding  the empirical 
results from distributed  lag investment  equations.  First, it has been frequently  argued that a 
measure of liquidity  should enter the model to account for access to investment  funds that 
affect the timing of investment  along the transition  path between  steady states.  In this model, 
associated  with  the  Lucas  Critique  is  identified,  but  it is not  quantitatively  important.  Using  a much  different  framework, 
Taylor  (1989)  arrives  at a  similar  conclusion. 
l6  The  geometric  adjustment  process  is employed  in (6) because,  with  the pronounced  trends  in I, and  &,  it is preferable  to 
specify  the  investment  equation  with  all variables  as ratios  or  rates. 
14 liquidity  is measured  as cash  flow  (CFJ and, to avoid  units  problems,  cash  flow  enters relative 
to  the  existing  capital  stock  (see  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and Petersen,  1988b).  The  specification  of 
this  variable  -  CF&r  -  implies  that  the  effects  of liquidity  on  investment  expenditures  are 
short-run,  perhaps  distributed  over  several  periods.  If financing constraints  affect  K*t in the 
long-run,  then,  lie  sales  and  the  user  cost,  CF, would  enter  as a percentage  change  (see 
Chirinko  and  Schaller,  1995).  There  is no evidence  in our  data  that  the  percentage  change  in 
CFI has  any  positive  effect  on investment. 
Second,  in the  presence  of non-static  expectations  and  delivery  lags,  the  terms  in (4) 
would  be distributed  over  current  and  future  periods  and  interpreted  as expected  values. 
Approximating  K*c linearly  and  assuming  that  expectations  of  the  output  and  user  cost  terms 
are based  on  extrapolations  of their  past  values,  we  obtain  an investment  equation  with 
distributed  lag  coefficients  that  are  a mixture  of expectation  and  technology  parameters. 
Because  the  number  of lags used in the extrapolations  need not be equal, the assumption  of 
extrapolative  expectations  suggests that the lengths of the sales and user cost lags may differ. 
In addition,  the possibility that capital is “putty-clay”  implies that  output  changes lead to a 
more rapid investment  response than user cost changes (Eisner and Nadiri,  1968; Bischoff, 
1971),  and  hence  the  coefficients  on  A&,  I U~4-r  and  ASit& I Soar  may  differ.  An 
examination  of  alternative  lag lengths  indicated  that  annual  lags  of 0 to  6 for  AUi,t/ Ui,t-l and 
lags  of 0 to  4 for  A!$,,/  Si,t-r  and  CFi,t/ Ki.t.1  are adequate.  These  considerations  lead  to  the 
following  specification: 
15 In (8), all of the variables are firm-specific, and hence are subscripted by “i”.  The 
coefficients  are assumed to be the same across firms except for the depreciation  rate, which 
varies depending on a firm’s mix of capital assets. The response  of the long-run  capital stock to 
percentage  changes in the user cost (uniform across firms) is captured by the sum of the a’s, 
which we refer to as the UCE.17 
3.  Econometric  Results 
In this section, we present a sequence of regression  estimates  of the UCE.  For clarity, 
we report  the sum of the distributed lag coefficients on the AU / U,,  and AS, / S,,  variables 
from equation  (8) (the SUM(a)  and SUM@) coefficients).  Full regression  results appear in 
appendix A  As we proceed through  the results, we observe how various  econometric  biases 
affect the UCE.  Detailed  consideration  of each bias provides  information  about possible 
pitfalls that  arise in estimating the UCE.  We conclude this section with our preferred  estimate 
of the UCE of approximately  -0.25. 
”  To see that the sum of the a’s  represents the elasticity of the long-run capital stock with respect to the user cost,  consider the 
following  abbreviated version of (8): 
I/K  =  6+I”/K  =  6  +  AK/K  =  6  +SUM(a)*(AU/U)  +  . . . 
Canceling 6’s and xeananging  yields an expression  for the elasticity: (AK / K)/(AU I U)  =  SUM(a).  Note that this derivation 
(ISSUIIICS  that AU / U is uniform across all firms.  Thii  assumption is relaxed when  analyzing  policy  in section 4. 
16 Resulti  with  Aggregate  Data Versus  Micro  Data 
Our  empirical exploration  begins with an aggregate  data regression  similar to those  in 
the literature.  Table 2 presents  summary estimates for two such equations.  In column  1, we 
report  a baseline with a specification  and lag lengths identical to those  we use in the micro data 
regressions.  The user cost data are taken from DRI to ensure a definition  of user cost 
comparable  to what we use with the micro data. 18 The estimated UCE (SUM(a))  is positive 
and insignificant.  The regression  in column 2 includes two lagged dependent  variables to 
correct  serial correlation  in the residuals indicated by the Lagrange  multiplier  statistic.  We 
obtain a negative  SUM(a)  in this model, but its standard error is very large.lg 
What happens  when we estimate this same specification  with micro data?  The answer 
is given by the first column  of table 3.  This is the regression presented  as equation  (1) in the 
introduction,  and it shows that the results from microeconomic  data regressions  can be 
dramatically  different  from those  in the corresponding  aggregate  regressions.  The SUM(a)  of 
-0.662 is precisely  estimated. 20 The hypothesis that the UCE is unity,  as often  assumed in 
policy analyses and calibrated  models, can be rejected.  An estimate  of -0.662  , in  contrast  to 
what we and others  find from aggregate  data, would support the central  importance  of the 
l8  The  sales  growth  variable  in our  micro  data regression  is replaced  by  GDP  growth  in the  aggregate  regressions.  Our 
derivation  of  the investment  model  is  independent  of  whether  the fum’s  optimization  problem  is  spccitied  with  value 
added  or gross  output,  as  long  as the production  technology  is strongly  separable  in  its arguments. 
lg  In addition  to the ‘specifications  reported  in table  2,  we  searched  for negative  SUM(a)‘s  in equations  that disaggregated 
equipment  and  structures  investment  as well  as equations  that excluded  volatile  computer  and  auto  investment  spending. 
We  also  searched  over  all possible  combinations  of  shorter lag lengths  for the AU, /  U,_, and  AGDP,  /  GDP,_, to see  if we 
could  obtain  negative  and  significant  SUM(a)‘s.  In most  cases,  the SUM(a)  was  positive.  When  it was  negative,  is was 
never  significantly  different  from  zero.  See  table  A2  in appendix  A  for more  detailed  discussion  of  these  results. 
2o Detailed  regression  results  with  coefficients  for each  lag  appear  in appendix  A.  Extending  the  lag  lengths  by  two  years 
had negligible  effects  on the  sum  of the coefficients  for both sales  grown  and  percentage  change  in  user  costs.  The 
estimated  distributed  lag  for the percentage  change&  the user cost  typically  follow  an approximate  hump-shaped  pattern. 
They  rise  in absolute  value  between  the contemporaneous  and  first lag estimates,  fall at the  second  lag,  and  drop  off 
substantially  after  the second  lag. 
17 UCE in a broad  range of economic  analyses.  This result, however,  is only suggestive.  There 
are a variety  of econometric  biases that may raise or lower this estimate.  We now address 
these issues to determine  the robustness of these micro-data  results. 
Finn  Heterogeneity:  Fixed  Versus Random Effects 
The regression  in the first column of table 3 assumes that the intercepts  are the same 
for all firms.  Even if user  cost elasticities are similar across firms, the assumption  of a common 
intercept  is dubious.  Among other factors, different depreciation  rates cause intercepts  to vary 
across firms (as in equation  S), and slope coefficients to be biased. 
The final three columns of table 3 present summary results from three estimators  that 
model firm-specific  effects as fixed or random.  The mean-difference  regression  is presented  in 
the second column.  The R* statistic rises substantially when fixed effects are included  and an F 
test resoundingly  rejects the equality of the firm intercepts.21  Note  that introducing  fixed firm 
effects with the mean-difference  estimator makes the estimated  SUM(u)  modestly  more 
negative  relative  to the pooled  model (-0.721 rather than -0.660).  It appears therefore  that 
heterogeneity  bias could be in part responsible for difficulty in finding negative  user cost 
elasticities  from aggregate  data, although the change in SUM(u)  between  the pooled  and 
mean-difference  regressions  is small, both economically  and statistically.** 
First-difference  and random effects estimators are alternative  ways to eliminate firm- 
specific effects.  In the first-difference  regression presented  in the third column of table 3 the 
*’  See  appendix  A  for  the  RZ definition  for  models  that  include  fmed  effects. 
**  In addition,  note  that  mean  differencing  reduces  the  estimated  SUM(P)  relative  to  the  pooled  regression.  This  result 
would  be  expected  if  firms’  investment  response  to  permanent  sales  shocks  exceeds  their  response  to  temporary  shocks. 
18 estimates  of  SUM(a)  (-0.538)  and  SUM@)  (0.192)  are  lower  than  their  mean-difference 
counterparts.  This  result  may  signal  measurement  error,  a possibility  explored  later  in this 
section.  The  random  effects  estimate  of  SUM(a)  is -0.634  and,  as  expected  with  this  more 
efficient  estimator,  the  standard  error  falls sharply.  However,  a Hausman  (1978)  test  statistic 
of  116.3  (distributed  as x2( 12)  under  the  null  hypothesis)  implies  that  the  random  effects 
estimates  are  inconsistent,  owing  to  a correlation  between  the  firm  effects  and  regressors. 
Having  rejected  the  pooled  and  random  effects  models,  we  subsequently  restrict  attention  to 
fixed  effect  models. 
Omitted  Variable Bias and Financing  Constraints 
Until  the  mid-1980s,  many  empirical  studies  of investment  assumed  that  firms  operate 
in perfect  capital  markets,  and  investment  can therefore  be modeled  without  reference  to  firm 
financial  conditions.2  An  extensive  body  of recent  research  tests  this  assumption  and,  in most 
cases,  finds  an important  role  for  variables  that  measure  access  to  finance  in investment 
equations.  The  financial  variable  used  most  often  in this  context  is internal  cash  flow.  If a firm 
has  access  to  internal  sources  of funds  for  investment,  it need  not  resort  to  debt  or  new  equity 
that  may  be rationed  or  involve  higher  costs  due  to  capital  market  imperfections.  If cash  flow 
is an important  determinant  of investment,  omitting  it from  the  regression  will bias  the  ~ 
estimated  UCE  insofar  as cash  flow  and  the  change  in user  cost  are correlated. 
We  examine  this  possibility  by including  cash  flow  in the  regressions  reported  in table 
4.  For  the  mean-difference  and  first-difference  models  in the  first  and  second  columns  the. 
Permanent  shocks  to  sales  are  more  likely  reflected  in the  cross-sectional  dimension  of  the  data,  which  is  eliminated  by 
the  mean-difference  transformation.  Eisner  (1978)  considers  similar  issues. 
19 estimated  SIJM(y)‘s and their standard errors lead us to strongly reject the null hypothesis  that 
investment  is independent  of cash flow.  Including cash flow lowers the SUM@) effect of sales 
growth,  which is not surprising given the likely positive correlation  between sales growth  and 
cash flo~.~~  More  important  for our purposes, however,  including cash flow lowers the 
absolute value of SUM(a)  from -0.721 to -0.502 in the mean-difference  regression  and from 
-0.538 to -0.421 in the first-difference  regression_ 
One explanation  for this finding is “income effects” induced by financing constraints. 
For a firm operating  in perfect capital markets, a user cost change induces substitution  effects 
only.  But as discussed in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen  (1988a), changes in user costs will 
change Grms’ total  costs and their available internal finance.  Changing internal finance can 
affect the behavior  of financially constrained  firms over and above the effects arising from 
substitution  alone.  A lower investment tax credit, for example, may have standard incentive 
effects on the demand for capital and investment but, for financially constrained  firms, the 
resulting  decline in cash flow could reduce investment further than if the firm operated  in 
perfect capital markets.  The existence of these “income effects” is consistent  with our findings 
in table 4.  In the regressions  without  cash flow, the estimated  SUM(a)  captures both the 
conventional  substitution  effect as well as the income effect induced by financing constraints, 
which go in the same direction.  When we add cash flow, however,  the estimated  SUM(a)  can 
be interpreted  as the user cost elasticity holding cash flow constant,  that is, as a measure of the 
23 Jorgenson  gives  a clear  statement  of  this  view  in  his  1971  survey. 
24 The  effect  of  cash  flow  on  the  sales  growth  coefficients  leads  to the  question  of  whether  the  importance  of  cash  flow 
arises  from  financing  constraints  or  cash  flow’s  role  as  a proxy  for  expected  demand.  This  issue  has  been  considered 
extensively  in the  financing  constraint  literature  (see  the  survey  in Hubbard,  1995).  Results  vary  across  different  studies, 
but  evidence  has  been  compiled  to  support  the  view  that  much  of  the  cash  flow  effect  is due  to  financing  constraints.  This 
issue  is not  of  major  concern  in our  context,  however,  because  of  our  focus  on  the  UCE. 
20 conventional  substitution  effect  alone.  As noted  in section  2,  it is this  substitution  effect  that 
represents  the  long-run  impact  of user  cost  changes  on  the  desired  capital  stock.  “Income 
effects”  through  cash  flow  operate  only  in the  short  run. 
Measurement  Error Bias 
As  mentioned  above,  one  explanation  for  the  low  SUM(o)  in the  first-difference 
regression  compared  with  the  mean-difference  regression  is the  presence  of measurement  error 
in the  regressors  (Hsiao,  1986,  p.64).  For  example,  user  cost  measures  do  not  reflect  all the 
intricacies of the  tax  code  (see  Ballentine,  1986  and  Devereux,  Keen,  and  Schiantarelli,  1994). 
To examine the  importance  of measurement  error,  we  compare  coefficients  estimated  by first- 
difference  and  “long-difference”  models.  For  the  long-difference  model,  each  variable  is 
transformed  by  subtracting  its value  lagged  two  years.  Griliches  and  Hausman  (1986)  observe 
that,  in the  presence  of measurement  error,  coefficients  from  the  first-difference  estimator  will 
be less  (ii  absolute  value)  than  coefficients  from  the  long-difference  estimator,  which  appear  in 
the  third  column  of table  4.  The  SUM(a)  coefficient  is virtually  the  same  in the  first-difference 
and  long-difference  regressions.  Measurement  error  in the  user  cost  variable  does  not  appear 
to  be a quantitatively  important  problem.  A prime  suspect  in prior  low  estimates  of the  user 
cost  elasticity  is found  “not  guilty.” 
Simultaneity  Bias and Time Dummies 
Several  concerns  with  the  least  squares  estimates  presented  to  this  point  suggest  the 
need  to  account  for  simultaneity  in the  estimation.  Indeed,  simultaneity  bias  provides  one 
possible  explanation  for  low  estimates  of the  UCE.  Investment  comprises  an important  and 
21 volatile  component  of aggregate  demand.  Short-run fluctuations  of investment  therefore 
correlate  with the business cycle, and business cycle movements  correlate  with interest  rates. 
Positive  aggregate  investment  shocks, for example, can cause positive  movements  in output, 
the demand for money,  and the demand for credit that tiect  the required  rates of return  on 
debt and equity.  The conventional  wisdom suggests (Mankiw and Summers,  1988, p. 716) 
that simultaneity  biases the UCE toward zero. 
Panel data with microeconomic  variation  in all regressors  provide  an opportunity  to 
address aggregate  sources of simultaneity in a particularly  simple way.  To the extent  that the 
correlation  between  the error term and the change in the user cost is due to aggregate  factors 
common to all firms, this correlation  can be swept out of the data with aggregate  time 
dummies (vs.  The results from including time dummies in the mean-difference,  first- 
dBerence,  and long-difference  regressions appear in table 5. Rather  than making investment 
more sensitive to the percentage  change in the user cost, however,  elimination  of aggregate 
simultaneity  reduces the absolute value of the SUM(a)  substantially  with all estimators. 
Aggregate  simultaneity  appears important,  but it has the opposite  effect on the UCE than has 
been often  assumed.2s 
Simultaneity  Bias and Instrumental  Variables 
While time dummies control  for simultaneity arising from aggregate  shocks,  one must 
also consider the possibility of additional  correlations  between the investment  error term and 
micro-level  regressors.  Firm investment  shocks may be contemporaneously  correlated  with 
22 sales and cash flow, or industry investment  shocks may affect the relative price of the capital 
goods  it purchases.  Problems  such as these suggest the need for instrumental  variables 
estimation.  Indeed,  the extensive variation  in our micro data will likely provide better 
instruments  than can be obtained  at the aggregate level. 
Following  common  practice,  we employ undifferenced  lags of the regressors  as 
instruments,  There is a problem with this approach,  however,  for the mean-difference 
estimator  when,  as in the present  case, instruments are pre-determined  but not strictly 
exogenous.  The problem arises because the transformed  error term in period t will be 
correlated  with the pre-determined  instruments dated period t, t-l,  t-2, etc.  In a mean- 
difference model,  the transformed  error term contains the mean of the Cm’s  error over the 
entire sample; that is, (E, + ~2  + .  .  . + Ed)  / T.  The presence of this mean error invalidates  the use 
of lags  of pre-determined  regressors  as instruments. 26 To solve this problem,  Arellano  (1988) 
and Arellano  and Bover  (1995) propose  an “orthogonal  deviation”  transformation  for panel 
data that allows one to remove fixed effects by subtracting the mean of future  observations 
from each regressor.  With this transformation,  lagged, pre-determined  regressors  are valid 
instruments.  The orthogonal  deviations  estimator is asymptotically  equivalent  to the first- 
25 A possible  explanation  for  this  result  is  a negative  correlation  between  aggregate  demand  shocks  and  the  relative  price 
of  capital  goods  (Pt /  Pv).  Such  correlation  would  result  if the  expansionary  cyclical  effect  of  aggregate  demand  shocks 
caused  output  prices  in  general  to  rise  more  than  the  price  of  investment  goods. 
26 The  bias  in  the  mean-difference  estimator  with  predetermined  variables  as  instruments  is  of  order  l/T,  where  T  is the 
number  of  time  observations  in the  panel.  Hence,  this  estimator  is consistent  as  T  goes  to  infinity.  In practice,  however, 
panel  data  sets  usually  provide  a relatively  small  number  of  time-series  observations  for  each  ftrm.  Our  regressions  are 
based  on  twelve  time  periods,  which  is  larger  than  many  panels,  but  not  sufficiently  large  that  we  can  confidently  rely  on 
asymptotic  resuhs  that  depend  on  large  T.  See  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995)  and  Urga  (1992).  The  problem  with  pre 
determined  but  not  strictly  exogenous  instruments  does  not  arise  for  the  first-difference  estimator  because  the  first- 
difference  transformation  subtracts  a  single  lagged  value  of  each  regressor  rather  than  the  mean  value  of  the  regressor 
over  the  panel.  With  first  differences,  lagged  values  of  the  regressors  are  legitimate  instruments  as  long  as  they  are 
lagged  enough  periods  to  avoid  correlation  with  the  first  difference  of  the  error  term. 
23 diierence  instrumental  variables estimator,  and it may be more efficient when, as usually 
happens in practice,  a subset of the available orthogonality  conditions  is used. 
We present  instrumental  variables results in table 6 for the mean-difference  (possibly 
biased), first-difference,  long-difference,  and orthogonal  deviations  estimators.  (The 
instrument  list for each regression  appears in the footnote  to table 6.)  Hausman tests reject the 
least squares specifications  with p values of two percent or less, implying that consistent 
estimation  requires instrumental  variables.  The point estimates of SUM(a)  range from the 
first-difference  value of -0.060 to the orthogonal  deviations estimate of -0.557. 
The results in table 6 lead to some interesting conclusions.  The SUM(a)  estimates 
imply that the UCE is likely negative.  It is clear that the UCE is significantly below unity (the 
Cobb-Douglas  benchmark  used in much applied research). Yet, the standard errors  of the 
SUM(a)  estimates  are relatively  large, both economically and statistically.  One cannot 
formally  reject the hypothesis  that the UCE is zero for the first-difference  and the long- 
difference  estimates.  Moreover,  the policy implications of a UCE near zero versus a UCE near 
one half are likely much different. 
The relatively  large standard  errors of SUM(a)  in table 6 and the corresponding 
variation  in their economic  interpretation  could be due to inefficient estimation  arising from 
including too  many lags.  To explore this possibility and determine the source of this 
imprecision,  we examine the individual lag coefficient estimates (presented  in appendix table 
A6), rather than focusing  exclusively on SUM(a).  Across the four instrumental  variables 
24 regressions,  the contemporaneous  and sixth lag AU, / U,, coefficients  are insignificantly 
diierent  from zero.  Most of the coefficients  at lags three or longer  are also insignificant.27 
The results in table 7 support the conjecture  that more precise estimates can be 
obtained  from a more parsimonious  lag structure.  Here, we present  summary results from a 
model that includes only the first and second lag of AU, / U,,.  The standard  errors decline by a 
factor  of at least three  and the range of point estimates for SUM(a)  narrows  substantially 
across the estimators.  All the SUM(a)  estimates are negative  and precisely estimated.  They 
are much smaller in absolute value than typically assumed, however,  ranging from -0.176 to 
-0.249.28 
Summary=  What Is the User Cost Elasticity? 
The information  about the user cost elasticity obtained  from our micro data (table 7) is 
vastly superior to that obtained  from the aggregate  data regression  (table 2).  The UCE, 
27 We  examined  many  different  lag  lengths  for  AU, I U,_, between  two  and  six  years.  There  was  little  evidence  of 
sign&ant  AU, I U,_, effects  beyond  the  second  lag  in  regressions  that  included  three,  four,  and  five  lags  of  AU, I U,_, 
(both  with  and  without  the  insignificant  contemporaneous  value  in the  regression).  The  one  exception  is the  orthogonal 
deviations  model  in which  the  fifth  lag  is  large  statistically  and  economically  and  the  diitriiuted  lag  pattcm.is  bimodal. 
We  find  this  bimodal  pattern  implausible.  Furthermore,  when  an  orthogonal  deviations  regression  is estimated  with  lags 
one  through  four for AU, I U,_, , SUM(a)  is quite  close  to the  estimates  in table  7. 
28 Cummins,  Hassctt,  and  Hubbard  (1994,  1996)  employ  micro  data  at times  of  major  tax  reforms  to  estimate  adjustment 
cost  paramctcrs  in  a q model  and  a cost-of-capital  model  based  on  Auerbach  (1989).  The  authors  are  succc.ssful  in 
obtaining  more  precisely  cstimatcd  and  economically  reasonable  adjustment  cost  parameters  than  have  typically  been 
found  in empirical  q  models  employing  aggregate  data.  The  emphasis  in  Cummins,  Hassett,  and  Hubbard  is on 
adjustment  cost  parameters  rather  than  the  UCE  and  their  results  are  not  directly  comparable  to  ours.  With  some 
additional  assumptions,  however,  we  can  roughly  compare  some  of  their  results  with  those  presented  here.  The  U.S.  data 
regression  Cummins,  Hassett,  and  Hubbard  (1994)  use  to  obtain  the  estimates  in  their  table  9 has  the  form: 
I/K  =  a  +  b  U,  where  I/K  is the  gross  investmentcapital  ratio  and  U  is a distributed  lead  of  the level  of the user  cost 
with  preset  weights  that  dccliie  geometrically  and  sum  to  unity.  Assuming  that  the  intercept  of  this  equation  contains  the 
geometric  depreciation  rate,  and  subtracting  the  depreciation  rate  from  both  sides  of  this  equation,  yields  the  percentage 
change  in  the  capital  stock  (the  net  investment-capital  ratio)  as  a linear  function  of  leads  in the  user  cost  level.  Cummins, 
Hassett,  and  Hubbard  report  an  average  value  for  their  user  cost  of  about  25  percent  and  an  average  estimated  value  for  b 
of  -0.66  in  years  of  major  tax  reform.  At  these  average  values,  a one  percent  permanent  change  in  future  user  costs 
yields  a 0.165  percent  change  in the  capital  stock  (.Ol  x  .25  x -0.66  =  0.00165).  Thus,  the  implied  UCE  is -0.165,  very 
close  to  the  range  of  our  findings  even  though  the  Cummins,  Hassett,  and  Hubbard  study  employs  a very  different 
empirical  approach. investment  from  1987 to  1985 or  1986  .30 These results help to mitigate  concerns  about the 
quantitative  importance  of the Lucas Critique in our context. 
i%e Effects  of Current  Tax Initiatives 
We follow  a two-step  process to estimate the effect of specific tax initiatives  on the 
capital  stock.  First, we determine the effect of the tax change on the user cost of capital. 
Because  user costs differ across firms, this calculation is performed  at the firm level, and 
therefore  requires micro data.  Second, the percentage  change in the aggregate  capital stock 
for our sample (K) is estimated from: 
where w, is firm i’s share of the total  capital stock.  While the Compustat  sample may not 
perfectly  represent  the U.S. economy,  its substantial coverage  suggests that these estimates 
will be a good  approximation  to the aggregate effect of policies that change the user cost. 
To estimate the firm-specific percentage  decline in the user cost as the result of the 
recent proposal  to cut the top marginal capital gains tax rate from 28 percent  to  19._8  percent, 
we follow  the approach  of Fazzari and Hereon (1996), who use assumptions  about corporate 
financial structure  that  are representative  for the U.S. economy.31 Weighting  these percentage 
3o The  range  of  UCE  estimates  from  the  instrumental  variable  regressions  with  time  dummies  was  marginally  higher  in 
absolute  value  than  those  reported  in table  7:  -0.231  for  mean  differences,  -0.279  for  first  difference,  and  -0.326  for 
orthogonal  deviations. 
31 These  assumptions  include  the  following:  fnms  pay  50 percent  of  their  income  as  dividends  and  50  percent  as  capital 
gains;  30  percent  of  new  investment  is  financed  with  debt  and  70  percent  with  equity;  the  real  required  rate  of  return  on 
equity  is  6 percent;  and  expected  inflation  is 3 percent.  For  the  results  reported  here,  each  firm’s  percentage  decline  in 
the  user  cost  is  determined  as  follows.  The  user  cost  can  be  expressed  as  the  product  of  components  representing  relative 
prices  (Pi),  corporate  taxes  (TJ,  and  a required  rate  of  return  (FtJ that  includes  depreciation  and  the  tax-adjusted 
opportunity  cost  of  funds  r that  the  firm  must  attain  to  compensate  its  investors:  Ui  =  Pi*Ti*R;  and  &  =  r+6,.  The 
capital  gains  tax  rate  affects  r,  and  the  percentage  change  in the  user  cost  from  a capital  gains  tax  rate  cut  can  be 
28 The Lucas  Critique and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
The Tax Reform  Act of 1986 was a significant policy change that raised the user cost 
during our  sample period and provides an opportunity  to test the empirical importance  of the 
Lucas Critique.  Ifit  were the case that the empirical UCE (which is not derived from an 
explicit,  policy-invariant  structural  model) changed with the Tax Reform  Act of 1986, one 
would  expect to observe large residuals around the time of the policy  change in our 
specification  that  maintains a uniform UCE over the sample.  Because  the user cost increases 
were, at least in part,  anticipated  prior to implementation  we might expect systematic increases 
of investment  in 1985, possibly  1986, relative to  1987 when the when the user cost rose.2g 
Including  time dummies in the panel data regressions  (which cannot  be done with 
aggregate  data) provides  a test for the systematic changes in the investment-capital  ratio 
implied by the Lucas Critique.  We include time dummies in the instrumental  variables 
regressions  reported  in table 7 and perform pair-wise equality tests on the  1985, 1986, and 
1987 time dummy coefficients.  We also test the joint  equality  of the time dummy coefficients 
for  1985, 1986, and  1987.  The lowest p-values we obtain from these tests are 0.241 for mean 
differences,  0.343 for first differences, and 0.165 for orthogonal  deviations.  The null 
hypothesis  of stability over the tax reform period cannot be rejected.  Moreover,  the time 
dummy coefficient  for  1987 is slightly higher than those for  1985 and  1986, further evidence 
against the view that the anticipation  of tax reform led firms to intertemporally  substitute 
2g The  effective  implementation  dates  varied  for  different  parts  of  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986. 
27 investment  from  1987 to  1985 or  1986  .30 These results help to mitigate  concerns  about the 
quantitative  importance  of the Lucas Critique in our context. 
The E#ects  of Current  Tax Initiatives 
We follow  a two-step  process to estimate the effect of specific tax initiatives  on the 
capital stock,  First, we determine the effect of the tax change on the user cost of capital. 
Because  user costs  differ across firms, this calculation is performed  at the firm level, and 
therefore  requires micro data.  Second, the percentage  change in the aggregate  capital stock 
for our sample (K) is estimated from: 
where WC  is firm i’s share of the total capital stock.  While the Compustat  sample may not 
perfectly  represent  the U.S. economy,  its substantial coverage  suggests that these estimates 
will be a good  approximation  to the aggregate effect of policies that change the user cost. 
To estimate the firm-specific percentage decline in the user cost as the result of the 
recent  proposal  to cut the top marginal capital gains tax rate from 28 percent  to  19,8 percent, 
we follow the approach  of Fazzari and Herzon (1996), who use assumptions  about corporate 
financial structure  that  are representative  for the U.S. economy.31  Weighting  these percentage 
3o The  range  of  UCE  estimates  from  the  instrumental  variable  regressions  with  time  dummies  was  marginally  higher  in 
absolute  value  than  those  reported  in table  7:  -0.231  for  mean  differences,  -0.279  for  first  difference,  and  -0.326  for 
orthogonal  deviations. 
31 These  assumptions  include  the  following:  firms  pay  50 percent  of  their  income  as  dividends  and  50  percent  as  capital 
gains;  30  percent  of  new  investment  is  financed  with  debt  and  70  percent  with  equity;  the  real  requirt~I  rate  of  return  on 
equity  is  6 percent;  and  expected  inflation  is 3 percent.  For  the  results  reported  here,  each  firm’s  percentage  decline  in 
the  user  cost  is  determined  as  follows.  The  user  cost  can  be  expressed  as  the  product  of  components  representing  relative 
prices  (Pi),  corporate  taxes  (TJ,  and  a required  rate  of  return  (RJ  that  includes  depreciation  and  the  tax-adjusted 
opportunity  cost  of  funds  r that  the  firm  must  attain  to  compensate  its  investors:  Ui  =  Pi*Ti*&  and  R  =  r+g,.  The 
capital  gains  tax  rate  affects  r,  and  the  percentage  change  in the  user  cost  from  a capital  gains  tax  rate  cut  can  be 
28 changes by the firm capital shares from  1991, the final year in our sample, yields a weighted 
average reduction  in the user cost of 1.89 percent.  The estimated impact of this change on the 
long-run  capital stock  is given in the first column of table 8 for a UCE of -0.25, consistent  with 
our regression  results.  This policy yields only about half a percentage  point increase in the 
long-run  capital stock.  Assuming a typical output  elasticity with respect to capital of 0.3, the 
capital gains tax cut is predicted  to have an impact on the level of output  of only 0.14 percent. 
The flat-tax  proposal  has a more substantial impact.  The flat tax would  allow firms to 
“expense” investment,  and it would  drive the tax component  of the user cost measure to 
unity.32 We calculated  the tax component  for the final year in the sample (199 1) for each firm 
and computed  the percentage  change in the firm’s user cost that would  result if this tax 
component  went to unity.  The weighted  average of these percentage  changes (with  1991 
capital shares as weights)  is -14.15 percent, which is the figure we use to estimate the impact 
of the Hall-Rabushka  flat tax proposal  on the long-run  capital stock  and output.  As the 
calculations  in table 8 show, our UCE estimate of -0.25 leads to a predicted  increase in the 
capital stock of 3.5 percent  and a predicted increase in the long-run  level of output  of  1.1 
percent.  In his simulation  of the Hall-Rabushka  (1995) flat tax, Auerbach (1996, table 3, 
~~prrssed  BJ AUi / Ui  =  Ar  I (r+6,).  The  term  (r+6J  is taken  from  our  micro  data.  Fazzari  and  Hexzon’s  estimates 
imply  that  r will  fall  by  7.42  percent  from  a base  of  4.53  percent  after  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  cut,  which  implies  that  Ar 
quals  .0742  *  .0453.  Note  that  6,  which  is  ignored  in  many  studies,  plays  a large  role  in  determiniig  AU  I U.  If 6 is  set 
to  zero,  the  percentage  change  in  the  user  cost  triples.  In our  calculations,  and  in  contrast  with  Fazzari  and  Hereon,  we 
have  not  adjusted  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  for  the  expected  holding  period  of  assets.  Thus  our  figures  are  an  upper  bound 
on  the  impact  of  cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  rate. 
32 The  flat  tax  would  have  another  effect  on  the  user  cost  that  we  do  not  measure  in this  exercise.  Interest  payments 
would  no  longer  be  deductible  for  corporate  tax  purposes.  This  change  would  raise  the  user  cost,  holding  pre-tax  interest 
rates  constant.  Debt  has  only  a one-third  weight  in our  user  cost,  however,  and  proponents  of  the  flat  tax  argue  that  other 
aspects  of  the  tax  reform  that  encourage  saving  would  lower  pre-tax  interest  rates.  For  these  reasons,  we  believe  the 
effect  of  eliminating  the  corporate  interest  expense  deduction  is  not  substantial.  The  calculations  presented  in  table  8 
should  be  viewed  as  an  upper  bound  on  the  magnitude  of  the  effect. 
29 column  2) finds  that  output  per  capita  increases  by 8.4 percent  in the  long  run.33  This  result  is 
based  on  a unitary  UCE  implicit  in the  Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  Our  results  are  also 
less than  a third  of the  increase  predicted  by Hall  and  Rabushka  due  to  the  increase  in the 
capital  stock  alone.34 
5.  Conclusion 
What  do  micro  data  reveal  about  the  user  cost  elasticity?  The  initial  pooled  regression 
suggested  that,  in contrast  to  estimates  based  on  aggregate  data  that  are  close  to  zero,  the 
UCE  takes  on  the  rather  sizable  value  of negative  two-thirds.  The  UCE,  however,  is affected 
by a variety  of econometric  biases.  Estimates  can  be raised  or  lowered  by biases  stemming 
f?om  heterogeneity  across  firms,  omission  of cash  flow  variables,  errors  in measuring  the  user 
cost,  and  simultaneity  among  regressors  and  errors.  The  extensive  panel  data  at our  disposal 
allow  us  to  investigate  these  biases.  Several  prove  important.  Evidence  from  a variety  of 
paneldata  estimators  indicates  that  the  true  UCE  is negative,  and,  in contrast  with  most 
studies  based  on  aggregate  data,  precisely  estimated.  The  point  estimate  is approximately  one 
quarter,  a much  lower  elasticity  than  the  value  of unity  typically  assumed  in appliedresearch. 
This  low  elasticity  has  important  implications  for  several  areas  of macroeconomic 
research.  It  suggests  that  models  that  rely heavily  on  prices  to  allocate  capital  -  especially 
those  in the  real business  cycle  tradition  -  may  be misspecified.  Our  modest  UCE  estimate 
33 Auerbach’s  estimate  reflects  general  equilibrium  effects  not  accounted  for  in our  analysis. 
34 Thii  calculation  is based  on  the  mid-point  of  the  2 to  4 percent  output  increase  range  that  Hall  and  Rabushka  (1995,  p. 
87)  predict  over  seven  years.  Because  Hall  and  Rabushka  assume  a 0.25  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to  capital,  a 3 
percent  output  increase  translates  into  a  12 percent  increase  in capital,  which  can  be  compared  to  our  figures  in  table  7. 
Hall  and  Rabushka  also  argue  that  the  flat  tax  would  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  capital  stock  resulting  in  further 
increases  in output.  We  cannot  assess  this  prediction  in our  framework  that  focuses  on  the  overall  quantity  of  capital. 
30 implies a correspondingly  modest effect of interest rates on investment,  weakening  the 
traditional  monetary  transmission  mechanism.  Finally, the effects of policy initiatives to 
. 
stimulate  capital formation  by cutting taxes are likely to be attenuated.  Reducing the capital 
gains tax rate from 28 to  19.8 percent would raise the long-run  capital stock by only a trivial 
amount  with a UCE in the range of our estimates.  Replacing  the current tax system by a flat 
tax would  increase the long-run  capital stock by about 3.5 percent,  much less than is claimed 
by proponents  of the flat tax.  There may be good  reasons for supporting  these tax policies, 
and thus for shifting the burden of taxation  away from upper-income  taxpayers.  A substantial 
increase  in the capital  stock is not one of them. 
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35 Table  1:  Summary  Statistics  for Micro  Data 
Variable  Mean  Median 
L/ K-1  0.173  0.125 
AS,/  S,,  0.030  0.018 
CFJ Kt.,  0.226  0.185 
AU,/  U,_,  -0.013  -0.023 
Within-Firm  Firm-Specific 
Standard  Deviation  Time  Variation 
0.163  0.979 
0.223  0.976 
0.272  0.987 
0.071  0.674 
Note:  PaneldataforCompustatfvmsf?om1981to1991,asdescribedinthetexL  &/&I  istheratiooffixmcapital 
spendingtothebeginningofpaiodcapitalstock,1SSt/SIisfirmsalesgrowth,CF1/IC.I  istheratiooftirmcashflowto 
the begim@+f-period  capital stock and AUJ Ut.1 is the percentage change in the user cost of capital.  The within-tirm 
star&d  deviation is computed atIer subtracting firm-by-firm means of each variable Finn each observation.  This statistic 
therefiimeasures  variation in the time dimension of the panel only.  The fim~qecific  time variation is one minus the Rz 
statistic tirn  a regression of each mean-differenced variable on a set of time dummies, as described further in the text. 
36 Table  2:  Aggregate  Data  Regressions 
&/IL,  =  cb(L)  NJtl  U,,  +  /3.(L) AGDP, / GDP,,  +  h2(L) I, / IC.,  +  I$ + E, 
Baseline  Suecification 
SUM(a)  0.246 
(0.232) 
SUWP)  0.557 
(0.428) 
suwv  - 
LW  0.885 
(0.246) 
Adjusted  R2  0.013 
Addition  of  Two 










Note:  Ordimq  least squares  estimates  with annual  data for 1972-1994.  Standard  errors are in parentheses.  The symbols 
cr&),  54(L), and &(L.) represent  polynomials  in the lag operator of order 6.4,  and 2, respectively.  The as(L)  and  pa) 
fonctions  begin  with order 0 and the Xi(L) function  begins  with order  1.  SUM(a),  SUM@),  and  SUM@.) are the sums of 
the e&rated  coef5cien~  () is an estimated  constant  The dependent  variable  (IJ  K-1) is the flow of real  investment 
spending  divided  by the current  dollar replacement  value of the capital  stock @ginning  of the period)  deflated  by the price 
index  for investment.  (The results  are robust when &  is measured  by the constant  dollar  replacement  value  of the capital 
stock.)  Ut is the user  cost of capital  as computed  by DRI (discussed  in detail  in the text),  and  is a weighted  average  of five 
components:  public  utility  structures,  building  and other structures  (excluding  mining,  exploration  and thrms),  automobile 
equipment,  off&+computing-accounting  equipment,  and other equipment.  GDPt is real  GDP in  1987 prices.  LMr is a 
modified  Lagrange  Multiplier  statistic  that evaluates  the null  hypothesis  of no first-order  serial  correlation;  it is distributed 
t under  the null. 
37 Table  3:  Micro  Data  Regressions  and  Heterogeneity  Bias 
L&t/&-,  =  O~(L)AUJU~N  +  p.(L)ASJSiL_,  +  4  +G,, 
Pooled  Fixed  Effects 
Regression  Mean 
(hi  = d for  all i)  Difference 





SU-WCL)  -0.660  -0.721  -0.538  -0.634 
(0.04 1)  (0.054)  (0.117)  (0.03 1) 
SUM(P)  0.488  0.322  0.192  0.405 
(0.009)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.012) 
RZ  0.120  0.411  0.422  0.119 
Nott:  Estimateswithmiaodata(1981-1991)andordinaryleastsquaresasdescribedinthetext.  Standarderrorsarein 
parentheses.  Individual coeflicient  estimates appear in appendix table A3.  The polynomials  in the lag operator as(L) and 
p4(L) are of order 6 and 4 and contain contemporaneous values.  SUM(a)  and SUM@) are the sums of the estimated 
coefficients; 6  is an estimak&  firm-specific constanL The sample for the random effects regression is a randomly selected 
subset of 19,108 observations Corn  the full data set of 26,071 observations.  The reduction in sample size is due to 
limitations on data size  in the LlMDEP software used to perform this regression.  To maintain comparability across fixed 
effkzt estimators, the R* statistic is defined to account for firm-specific intercepts as described in appendix A. 
38 Table  4: Omitted  Variable  Bias  and  Measurement  Error 
Ii.t/Ki.t4  =  m(L)AUiJU~,  +  P.(L)ASJSic,  +  yr(L)CFi,JKi+,  +  @i +Q 
Mean 
Difference 
S~(~~  -0.502 
(0.053) 
SUM(P)  0.153 
(0.012) 


















RZ  0.457  0.466  0.484 
Note:  See notes  to table  3.  Estimation  with  ordii  least squares.  Individual  uxffkient  estimates  appear  in appendix 
table A4.  The lag operator  polynomial  p(L)  incorporates  contemporaneous  and  four annual  lags of cash flow. 
39 Table  5:  Simultaneity  Bias  and  Aggregate  Time  Dummies 
IiJLt  =  a&)  A:J, /  Vi+, +  p,(L) AS, / SW  +  y,(L)  CFti  / Ki,,  +  +i +  yt  + Q 
Mean Difference  First  Difference  Long Difference 
RZ  0.460  0.463  0.480 
-0.289  -0.087  -0.107 
(0.106)  (0.143)  (0.103) 
0.150  0.041  0.114 
(0.02 1)  (0.025)  (0.019) 
0.258  0.290  0.281 
(0.012)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Note:  See notes to table 3.  Estimation is with oniimy  least squares. Individual coe&icnt  estimates appear in appendix 
table As.  The symbol ylt mpresents a time dummy coefficient for each year in the data. 
40 Table  6:  Simultaneity  Bias  and  Instrumental  Variables  Regressions  i 
I* I Kit.,  =  oh(L)  AU* / UQ-~  +  p,(L)  A&  / Sb-1 +  y,(L)  CFa / I&  +  @i +Eiz 
Me-an  First  Long  Orthogonal 
Difference  Difference  Difference  Deviations 
SUWCL)  -0.254  -0.060  -0.320  -0.557 
(0.140)  (0.228)  (0.192)  (0.157) 
SUWP)  0.080  0.155  -0.004  0.084 
(0.068)  (0.091)  (0.065)  (0.107) 
SUM(Y)  0.421  0.511  0.478  0.472 
(0.092)  (0.077)  (0.052)  (0.050) 
Note:  See notes to table 3.  Individual coefficient estimates appear in appendk  table A6.  The instruments for the mean- 
difkrcacc  and o&opal  deviations qressions  are the levels (undiffTerencad)  of A&t/  &I.  lagged one through nine years 
and A&/  &,+I,  and CFu / I+  lagged one through seven years.  The instruments for the Greta-  repssion  are the 
levcl~ of AUU / Ubl,  lagged two through ten years and A&/  &-I. and CFiJ I&J-I  lagged two thfqh  eight years.  The 
inbuments  for the longdifference  rep&on  are the levels  of ALh,t  /  U  *I,  lagged three through eleven years and 
A&  / &,,  and CFu / &I  lagged three through nine years. 
41 Table  7: Instrumental  Variables  Regressions  with  Short  Lags  for AUU 1 U~el 
Mean 
Difference 
Suwa)  -0.207 
(0.026) 
SUWP)  0.118 
(0.062) 


























Note:  See notes  to table  3.  Individual  coefficient  estimates  appear in appendix  table A7.  The SUM(a)  coeffkient  is the 
sum of the coeffkients  on the first and second lags of AU* / Q-1  .  Note. that this distribute-d lag excludes  the 
contemporaneous  value  for reasons  described  in the text. Instruments  are the same as those described  in the note’ to table  6. 
42 Table  8:  Policy  Effects 
Capital  Gains 
Tax  Rate  Cuts 








+O.  14% 





Note: The AU/U  row shows the estimated percentage decline in the user cost of capital  which is a weighted  average of 
e&mated  firm-specific  percentage  changes  in the Wzr cost  The weights  reflect  each firm’s  share of capital  in the data 
sample.  TheAU/Uforthccapitalgainstaxisbased~Fepariand~n(19%~asdcscribedinthetext  Thedecline 
fortheOattaxpoticyisbasedonthe~uthars’calculatiansasdesnibedinthetext  TIteAK/Krowshowsthepenxntage 
change in the long-  capital  stock as a result  of the user cost decline  given  a user  cost elasticity  of -0.25.  The AY I Y is 
the long run  percentage  change  in output  as a result  of the increase  in the capital  stock assuming a 0.3 elasticity  of output 
with respect to the capital  stock. 
43 Appendix  A:  Detailed  Regression  Results 
The  following  tables  give  detailed  information  about  the  summary  regression 
results  presented  in tables  2 through  6 in the  text.  The  appendix  tables  are  numbered  to 
correspond  to  the  text  tables.  (Table  A2  corresponds  to  table  2 in the  text,  for  example.) 
In  tables  A3  through  A6,  the  variable  mnemonics  correspond  to  the  symbols  in the 
text  as follows: 
PCUCI  AU,  1 Ui.tvl 
SG  ASI  S,., 
CF_Kl  CFi, 1 I& 
A single  digit  following  any  of the  symbols  above  indicates  a lag  of the  number  of years 
given  by the  digit.  Time  dummies  are  denoted  by DUMnn,  where  M  is the  appropriate 
year.  Rsq.  stands  for  the  R-squared  statistic. 
To  maintain  comparability  in the  R* statistic  across  models  with  Grm-specific 
intercepts  we  compute  R* as follows.  For  the  models  that  include  lags  of the  percentage 
change  in the  user  cost  and  the  percentage  change  in sales,  R* is defined  with  regression 
residuals  (%J  from: 
(Al)  ei  t  =(I/K)i,t  -ci  -hgO&h  ri,t-h 
-  “it  h 
, 
i,t-h-l  -  hiOPh  Si  ,I,, 
, 
where  Gh  and  p,, are  regression  coefficients.  The  estimated  firm-specific  intercept  is given 
by: 
(A2)  6,  =(1/T)  ; 
AU 
t=1 
(I/Qi  t-  C  & 
h”,  hU 
i,t-h 
’  -  i,t_h_l 
where  T is the  number  of years  in the  panel.  This  definition  of the  residuals  gives  the 
conventional  R* for  the  mean-difference  estimator.  For  the  first-difference  and  long- 
difference  estimators,  this  definition  may  result  in R* statistics  that  do  not  necessarily  rise 
when  additional  variables  are  added  to  the  regression  model.  We  use  this  definition  of R*, 
appropriately  modified  to  account  for  alterations  in the  regression  equation,  for  all the 
OLS  fixed  effects  regressions  reported  in the  paper. Table  A2:  Aggregate  Data  Regressions 




(1)  (2) 
A  Without Lagged Dependent Variable 
SUM0  0.246  0.548  -0.065  0.472 
(0.232)  (0.142)  (0.508)  (0.602) 
SUwP)  0.557  0.455  0.764  10.107 
(0.428)  (0.366)  (0.840)  (0.910) 
iI2  0.013  0.381 
L”1  0.885  0.627 
(0.246)  (0.271) 
B. With Lagged Dependent Variables 
suM(cr)  -0.025  0.20 1 
(0.067)  (0.09 1) 
SUwP)  0.164  0.145 
(0.114)  (0.187) 
suM(v  0.860  0.685 
(0.086)  (0.126) 
iI2  0.936  0.856 
L”1 
-0.439  -0.92 1 








-0.235  0.348 
10.356  10.070 
(0.207)  (0.244) 
0.076  -0.036 
(0.178)  (0.153) 
0.512  0.353 











Table footnote  appears on the following page. Ordinary  least squares estimates with annual data for  1972-1994.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  &),  p,(L), and L(L)  are polynomials  in the lag operator  of order 6,4,  and 
2, respectively;  the polynomials  for a&)  and p,(L) begin with 0; for L(L.) with  1. 
SUM(a),  SUM@), and SUM@) are the sums of the estimated  coefiicients;  Q is an 
estimated  constant.  The dependent  variable (I&r)  is the flow of real investment 
spending divided by the current  dollar replacement  value of the capital stock (beginning of 
the period)  deflated by the price index for investment.  (The results are robust when &  is 
measured by the constant  dollar replacement value of the capital stock.)  The capital 
goods  included in these investment  and capital series vary across the four columns.  U, is 
the rental price of capital as computed  by DRI (discussed in detail in the text), and is a 
weighted  average of five components:  public utility structures,  building and other 
structures  (excluding mining, exploration  and farms), automobile  equipment,  office- 
computing-accounting  equipment,  and other equipment.  The weighted  average changes 
so that RP1 corresponds  to the capital goods included in the investment  and capital series 
for a model in a given column; the weights depend on current  dollar capital stocks and 
vary over time.  GDPt is real GDP in 1987 prices.  LMr is a modiied  Lagrange  Multiplier 
statistic that evaluates the null hypothesis  of no first-order  residual serial correlation;  it is 
distributed  t under the null.  The lag lengths in panel A are identical to those used with the 
micro data.  A search over various  lag lengths (all possible combinations  of less than or 
equal to 6 for a(L)  and less than or equal to 4 for p(L)) to find the most negative value of 
SUM(a)  in the aggregate  model yielded -.003,0,  -. 188, and -. 105 (all with large standard 
errors)  for the models in columns (l)-(4),  respectively. 
3 Table  A3:  Micro  Data  Fiegressions  and Heterogeneity  Bias 
Coef.  Std.  Cqef.  Std.  Coef.  Std.  Coef.  Std. 
PCUCI  -0.126  0.016  -0.144  0.016  -0.082  0.018  -0.134  0.019 
PCUCIl  -0.201  0.016  -0.205  0.015  -0.142  0.023  -0.191  0.018 
PCUCI2  -0.159  0.017  -0.155  0.015  -0.100  0.024  -0.159  0.018 
PCUC13  -0.043  0.016  -0.060  0.015  -0.015  0.025  -0.037  0.017 
PCUCI4  -0.051  0.015  -0.054  0.015  -0.046  0.026  -0.044  0.017 
PCUCIS  -0.088  0.016  -0.099  0.015  -0.116  0.027  -0.086  0.017 
PCUC16  0.009  0.025  -0.004  0.023  -0.037  0.026  0.017  0.028 








-0.721  -0.538  0.117  -0.634 
SG  0.151 
SGl  0.114 
SG2  0.102 
SG3  0.060 






0.085  0.006  0.136 
0.051  0.007  0.097 
0.039  0.007  0.089 
0.008  0.007  0.047 
0.009  0.006  0.038 

















Pooled  OLS  Mean-diff.  OLS  First-diff.  OLS  Random  Effects 
INTERCEPT  0.144 
-q.  0.120  0.411  0.422  0.119 
Obs.  26071  26071  21939  19108 Table  A4:  Omitted  Variable  Bias  and  Measurement  Error 
PCUCI  -0.088  0.016 
PCUCIl  -0.155  0.014 
PCUCIZ  -0.123  0.014 
PCUC13  -0.024  0.014 
PCUC14  -0.037  0.014 
PCUCIS  -0.087  0.014 









0.018  -0.098  0.024 
0.022  -0.095  0.020 
0.023  -0.080  0.024 
0.025  -0.028  0.023 
0.025  -0.012  0.027 
0.026  -0.068  0.023 
0.025  -0.020  0.030 
SUm  -0.502  -0.421  0.114  -0.402  0.087 
SG  0.079 
SGl  0.033 
SG2  0.029 
SG3  0.006 














0.047  0.006  0.080  0.006 
0.004  0.007  0.002  0.006 
0.006  0.007  0.035  0.008 
-0.011  0.007  -0.003  0.006 
0.002  0.006  0.001  0.007 
SUm  0.153  0.049  0.025  0.115  0.019 
CF Kl  0.102 
CF-Kll  0.101 
CF-K12  0.036 
CF-K13  O.Ql8 
CFK14  0.009 
0.130  0.005  0.110  0.005 
0.105  0.005  0.137  0.006 
0.041  0.005  0.018  0.006 
0.015  0.005  0.017  0.006 
0.003  0.005  0.004  0.005 
SUXll  0.265  0.296  0.016  0.285  0.012 
Rsq.  0.457  0.466  0.484 
Obs.  26071  21939  18368 
Mean-diff.  OLS  First-diff. OLS  Long-diff.  OLS 
Coef.  Std.  Std.  Coef.  Std. Table  A5:  Simultaneity  Bias and Aggregate  Time  Dumnies 
Mean-diff.  OLS  First-diff.  OLS  Long-diff.  OLS 
PCUCI  -0.088  0.020  -0.b80  0.022  -0.111  0.032 
PCUCIl  -0.136  0.017  -0.117  0.027  -0.075  0.023 
PCUCI2  -0.110  0.017  -0.071  0.030  -0.070  0.029 
PCUC13  0.008  0.016  0.050  0.032  0.047  0.028 
PCUCI4  -0.002  0.017  0.029  0.033  0.021  0.032 
PCUCIS  -0.013  0.018  0.026  0.036  0.056  0.031 
PCUCIG  0.051  0.029  0.076  0.034  0.025  0.043 
SUm  -0.289  0.061  -0.087  0.143  -0.107  0.103 
SG  0.077  0.004  0.044  0.006  0.079  0.006 
SGl  0.031  0.004  -0.001  0.007  -0.003  0.006 
SG2  0.030  0.005  0.006  0.007  0.037  0.008 
SG3  0.005  0.005  -0.012  0.007  -0.005  0.006 
SG4  0.008  0.005  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.007 
SUlll  0.150  0.012  0.041  0.025  0.114  0.019 
CF Kl  0.099  0.004  0.129  0.005  0.108  0.005 
CF-Kll  0.099  0.004  0.104  0.005  0.135  0.006 
CF-Kl2  0.036  0.004  0.040  0.005  0.017  0.006 
CF-K13  0.017  0.004  0.014  0.005  0.017  0.006 
CF-Kl4  0.007  0.004  0.003  0.005  0.004  0.006 
SUItl  0.258  0.007  0.290  0.016  0.281  0.012 
DUM82  -0.015  0.005  -0.020  0.005 
DUM83  -0.031  0.005  -0.036  0.007 
DUM84  -0.000  0.005  -0.001  0.009 
DUM85  -0.013  0.005  -0.010  0.010 
DUM86  -0.010  0.006  -0.006  0.011 
DUM87  -0.014  0.006  -0.012  0.012 
DUM88  -0.020  0.006  -0.020  0.013 
DUM89  -0.026  0.005  -0.029  0.014 
DUM90  -0.038  0.005  -0.041  0.015 
DUM91  -0.047  0.006  -0.052  0.016 
-0.032  0.006 
0.021  0.007 
-0.013  0.008 
0.015  0.010 
-0.020  0.010 
-0.004  0.010 
-0.035  0.011 
-0.024  0.012 
-0.056  0.013 
Rsq.  0.460  0.463  0.480 
Obs.  26071  21939  18368 
Coef.  Std.  Coef.  Std.  Coef.  Std. 
6 Table  A6:  Simultaneity  Birr  and  Instnmen tal Variables  Regre88ions 
PCUCI  0.021  0.062 
PCUCIl  -0.129  0.021 
PCUCI2  -0.120  0.022 
PCUCI3  0.013  0.024 
PCUCI4  -0.009  0.022 
PCUCIS  -0.063  0.023 









0.100  -0.015  0.098  -0.020  0.080 
0.047  -0.163  0.045  -0.212  0.037 
0.047  -0.033  0.027  -0.128  0.033 
0.042  -0.027  0.034  -0.023  0.029 
0.040  0.000  0.039  -0.051  0.030 
0.047  -0.049  0.041  -0.095  0.042 
0.041  -0.032  0.080  -0.028  0.049 
sum  -0.254  0.140  -0.060  0.228  -0.320  0.192  -0.557  0.157 
SG  0.028  0.048  0.055  0.097  -0.046  0.077  -0.106  0.130 
SGl  0.021  0.009  0.035  0.021  0.055  0.016  0.074  0.018 
SG2  0.022  0.009  0.039  0.013  -0.019  0.007  0.051  0.008 
SG3  0.002  0.007  0.011  0.012  0.027  0.010  0.033  0.010 
SG4  0.007  0.006  0.015  0.009  -0.021  0.008  0.031  0.008 
SUm  0.080  0:068  0.155  0.091  -0.004  0.065  0.084  0.107 
CF Kl  0.316  0.115  0.528  0.102  0.443  0.074  0.514  0.097 
CF-Kll  0.049  0.026  -0.045  0.039  0.004  0.030  -0.053  0.039 
CF-K12  0.033  0.005  0.024  0.010  0.016  0.006  0.010  0.008 
CF-K13  0.015  0.005  0.002  0.008  0.008  0.008  -0.002  0.008 
CFzKl4  0.008  '0.005  0.003  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.002  0.006 
SUm  0.421  0.092  0.077 
Obs.  26071 
0.511 
21939 
0.478  0.052  0.472  0.052 
18368  21939 
Mean-diff.  IV'  First-diff.  IV  Long-diff.  IV  Orthog-dev.  IV 
Coef.  Std.  Std.  Coef.  std.  Coef.  Std. 
7 Table  A7:  Inrtrumental  Variables  Regressions  with  Short  Lags  for  PCUCI 
PCuCIl  -0.112  0.016  -0.138  0.035 
PCUCI2  -0.094  0.018  -0.101  0.031 
Coef.  std. 
-0.138  0.031 
-0.038  0.022 
-0.176  0.033 
-0.019  0.059 
0.055  0.014 
-0.019  0.007 
0.028  0.009 
-0.021  0.008 
0.025  0.053 
0.454  0.061 
0.002  0.026 
0.016  0.006 
0.008  0.008 
0.007  0.006 
0.487  0.043 
-0.145  0.021 
-0.104  0.023 
SUm  -0.207  0.026  -0.239  0.060  -0.249  0.032 
SG  0.060  0.044  0.047  0.077 
SGl  0.017  0.008  0.044  0.018 
SG2  0.026  0.009  0.044  0.013 
SG3  0.006  0.007  0.019  0.011 
SG4  0.009  0.007  0.016  0.008 
0.036  0.081 
0.057  0.013 
0.052  0.008 
0.028  0.009 
0.029  0.007 
SUlIl  0.118  0.062  0.170  0.077  0.202  0.070 
CF  Kl  0.419  0.079  0.493  0.086 
CFKll  0.024  0.018  -0.033  0.034 
CF-K12  0.031  0.005  0.024  0.010 
CF-K13  0.014  0.005  0.001  0.008 
CFKl4  0.009  0.005  0.002  0.007 
0.502  0.087 
-0.047  0.036 
0.011  0.008 
0.001  0.007 
0.002  0.006 
SUEI  0.497  0.063  0.487  0.068  0.468  0.045 
Obs.  26071  21939  18368  21939 
Mean-diff.  IV  First-diff.  IV  Long-diff.  IV  Orthog-dev.  IV 
Coef.  Std.  Coef.  Std.  Coef.  Std. Appendix  B:  Data  Definitions 
This  appendix  describes  the  firm-specific  variables  in the  study.  All of the 
accounting  data  are from  the  Compustat  Industrial  Database  maintained  by  Standard 
and  Poor. 
Sales 
This  variable  is gross  sales  during  the  year  reduced  by cash  discounts,  trade 
discounts,  and  returned  sales  or  allowances  to  customers. 
Cash Flow 
Cash  flow  is the  sum  of several  variables  fi-om Compustat.  It  includes: 
1.  Income  before  extraordinary  items; 
2.  Depreciation  and  amortization; 
3.  Deferred  Taxes; 
4.  Equity  in net  loss  (earnings);  and 
5.  Extraordinary  items  and  discontinued  operations. 
The  first  two  components  of  cash  flow  (income  and  depreciation)  are  seldommissing 
from  firms’  balance  sheets.  If the  a firm  reports  a missing  value  for  either  one  of these 
variables,  we  produce  a missing  value  for  cash  flow.  The  last  three  items,  however, 
are  missing  a greater  percentage  of the  time.  We  assume  that  when  they  are  missing, 
their  values  are  economically  insignificant,  and  we  set  them  to  zero. 
9 The  Replacement  Value  of Capital 
The capital  stock  appears in the denominator  of our dependent  variable.  The 
problem with using the book  values of gross or net property,  plant, and equipment  is 
that if the  capital is many years old, its book value may severely understate  the current 
value of the capital,  especially in periods of high inflation.  Salinger and Summers 
(1983) present  an algorithm  for approximating  the current  replacement  value of capital 
using accounting  data such as that supplied by Compustat.  Since its initial 
introduction,  many researchers  have used variations  of the &linger-Summers 
algorithm  to construct  capital stock series.  We modified the original algorithm  to 
make it more useful in approximating  capital stocks for a wider variety  of firms. 
The basic idea behind the algorithm is to build iteratively  a replacement  value 
series using three  steps.  First, take the previous year’s value and intlate it in 
proportion  to aggregate  inflation to obtain the capital stock’s replacement  value today 
in the absence of other  changes.  Second, add the value of the current year’s 
investment,  and third,  account  for capital lost to depreciation.  In constructing  the 
series, Salinger and Summers make several assumptions: 
1.  All of a firm’s capital has the same life (LIFE). 
2.  Firms use the straight-line  method for book  depreciation. 
3.  All investments  are made at the beginning of the year, and all depreciation  is taken 
at the end of the year. 
Given these assumptions,  they estimate the useful capital stock life in any year as 
W) 
where 
10 GPLANI;  =  the  book  value  of gross  plant  in year  t  ; 
4  =  capital  expenditures  in year  t  ; and 
DEPR,  =  book  depreciation  in year  t  . 
Because  LIFE,  fluctuates  f&m  year  to year,  Saliiger  and  Summers  substitute  the 
average  life for  each  firm  over  the  sample  (LEE).  They  further  assume  that  the  actual 
depreciation  rate  is exponential  with  depreciation  rate  6 = 2 / LEE,  equivalent  to 
double  declining  balance  depreciation. 
The  main  formula  for  the  iterative  algorithm  is: 
WI  RK,  =(RK+,~+I,)U-6). 
where  RK, is the  replacement  value  of the  capital  stock  at time  t and P, is the  implicit 
price  deflator  for  non-residential  capital  goods.  There  are  three  major  extensions  to 
the  algorithm  which  we  use  in this  study.  First,  we  make  the  treatment  of changes  in 
capital  more  general.  A drawback  to  the  original  &linger-Summers  specification  is 
that  it implicitly  assumes  that  capital  spending  (I,  ) is the  only  way  to  change  the 
capital  stock  Corn  year  to  year.  In fact,  acquisitions  and  divestitures  can  augment  and 
deplete  the  capital  stock  independent  of reported  investment.  To  obtain  a more 
flexible  specification  for  RK, , we  replace  1,  in equation  (B2)  with  a more  general 
capital  change  variable,  KCHG,  : 
03%  R-K‘  = (  m,_,  ++  KCHG,  (i-s). 
f-1  ) 








AGPLAfl  = I, + ACQUrs,  - RE27REt 
LUK’XANT = I, + ACQU&  - DEPR, 
=  the change in gross plant from year  t -  1 to year t ; 
=  the change in net plant fi-om year  t -  1 
to year  t  ; 
=  acquisitions in year  t  ;l  and 
=  retirements in year  t  .* 
In the event of an acquisition,  the change in capital,  KCHGl,  equals  I,  + ACQUIS,  . 
Because  Compustat  does not have reliable figures for  ACQvrS,  , we rearrange 
equation  A4 to obtain: 
W)  I,  + ACQUIS,  = AGPLANII; + RETLRE, 
W)  or  KCHG,  = AGPWT,  + RETIRE, 
In the event of a divestiture,  we want to decrease the capital stock by the depreciated 
value of the capital sold.  In this case: 
WO  KCHG,  = AiYPLANI; 
If there is no major acquisition  or divestiture, then we retain the original formula: 
W)  KCHG,  = I, 
’ According  to  the  Compustat  manual,  acquisitions  are  defined  as  ‘cash  outflow  or  funds  used  for,  and/or  costs 
relating  to,  acquisition  of  a company  in the  current  year  or  effects  of  an  acquisition  in a prior  year  carried  over 
to  the  current  year.” 
’ Compustat  defines  retirements  as  “a  deduction  from  a company’s  property,  plant,  and  equipment  account 
resulting  from  the  retirement  of  obsolete  or  damaged  goods  and/or  physical  structures.” 
12 The  task,  now,  is to  derive  an empirical  test  to  determine  whether  a firm  has 
undergone  an acquisition  or  divestiture  in a given  year.  There  are  two  rules  of  thumb 
that  aid us in this  search.  First,  AGPM  is normally  less  than  1,  because  of 
retirements.  Therefore,  if  AGPLAIvir; > 1,  by a “substantial”  amount,  it signals  an 
acquisition  with  a high  probability.  Second,  AGPLJN~  is normally  greater  than 
REi7RE~  because  retirements  are the  only  way  to  reduce  GPUNT,  .  Therefore,  if 
AGPLAfl  c REi7RE~  by a “substantial”  amount  it signals  a divestiture. 
We  define  a “substantial”  amount  as a discrepancy  of ten  percent  or  more.  The 
point  of imposing  the  ten  percent  limit  is to  make  acquisition  and  divestiture 
adjustments  conservative.  That  is, we  only  deviate  f?om  the  standard  Salinger- 
Summers  formula  when  there  is clear  evidence  that  this  formula  is misleading.  In this 
case,  if 
AGPLANI;-I,  >ol 
GPLAw_,  ” 
then  we  assume  an acquisition  and  set  KCHG,  = AGPLAW  + RETIRE,  from 
equation  (B7).  In  contrast,  if 
(BlI) 
AGPLANT,  +REK?R&  < -o  1 
GPm_, 
. , 
then  we  assume  a divestiture  and  KCHG,  = ANPUNK  from  equation  (BS).  If 
neither  rule  holds,  we  simply  set  KCHG,  equal  to  I,. 
The  second  major  extension  to  the  algorithm  deals  with  the  measurement  of 
depreciation.  There  are two  potential  problems  associated  with  the  depreciation  rate 
13 calculated  by &linger  and Summers.  First, they assume that it follows  a double 
declining balance yielding  a depreciation  rate  6 = 2 / LIFE  .  If this estimate  of 
depreciation  is too  large, it could lead us to  devalue  the  capital  stock  too  quickly.  An 
alternate  (and  commonly  made)  assumption  is a single  declining  balance,  or 
S = 1 / LIFE.  This  method,  however,  may be too  extreme in the other  direction.  We 
use a depreciation  rate of  S =  1.5  / WFE  .  This value  makes the  average  depreciation 
rate  we  estimate  for  the  Compustat  sample  similar  to  depreciation  rates  obtained  from 
aggregate  data. 
The  second  problem  that  arises  in this  area  is in the  reported  depreciation  of 
firms  which  may  be  inconsistent  with  their  GPLANT and NPLANTfigures.  This over- 
estimate  of depreciation  could again lead us to devalue the capital  stock too  quickly. 
To obtain an alternate  measure of depreciation,  subtract equation  (BS) from equation 
(B4)  to  obtain: 
0312)  AGPLANT  -  AhRCAN~  = DEPR, -REURE, 
0313)  or  DEPR,  = AGPLAV  -  ANPUNT  + RETIRE, 
If  RK,  (computed  using  the  firm-supplied  depreciation  number)  is less  than  - 
NpLANT  where  T  is the maximum  year  for  each  firm,  then  the  imputed  depreciation 
rate  is probably  too  large  because  the  book  value  of NPLANT  should  be lower  than  the  _ 
replacement  value  of  capital  in an inflationary  environment.  In  this  case,  we  compute 
an alternate  RK,  series  using  the  depreciation  figures  derived  in equation  Al3  as long 
as the  new  RK,  is larger  than  the  old  one.  If  R.K,  using  the  original  method  is Zarger 
than  NPLANTr  , then  we  use  it. 
14 The  third  extension  provides  an efficient  means  to  get  the  algorithm  started. 
To  implement  the  original  algorithm,  &linger  and  Summers  rely  on  pre-sample 
aggregate  data  to  provide  seed  values  for  the  firms’  capital  stock.  We  simply  use  the 
reported  book  value  of net  property,  plant,  and  equipment  (iVPLAh’7)  for  the  first 
observation  of  each  firm.  That  is, if a firm’s  data  starts  in  1975,  RK,,  equals 
NPLANT  in that  year  with  each  year  thereafter  computed  using  equation  (B3)  above. 
Because  the  book  value  of NPLANT  will usually  be less  than  the  replacement 
cost,  the  use  of this  seed  value  creates  a distortion  in the  algorithm.  This  distortion 
will  be offset,  however,  by several  factors.  First,  any  firm  that  is in the  sample  at the 
beginning  of the  dataset  in the  early  seventies  did  not  experience  historically  large 
inflation  rates  in the  preceding  years,  so its book  value’s  understatement  of its 
replacement  cost  should  be relatively  small.  Second,  the  capital  stock  of  any new  firm 
that  enters  the  dataset  thereafter  is presumably  new  capital,  so that,  again,  its book 
value  should  be fairly  close  to  its replacement  cost.  In  addition,  even  if there  is a large 
difference  between  the  actual  and  estimated  initial  replacement  cost,  any  distortionaty 
effect  will  decline  over  time  as the  initial  capital  depreciates  away. 
15 